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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of the district courts decisions to revoke and reinstate the 
defendant's probation which occurred on March 27, 2006. R. 162. For appellate review 
is the district court's February 21, 2006 and January 9, 2006 incorrect determinations that 
Defendant had violated the terms of her probation by allegedly underpaying her 
restitution. After erroneously finding on January 9, 2006 that Defendant underpaid her 
restitution, on February 21, 2006, the court revoked Ms. Gambill's probation and 
reinstated her 36 month's probation. Ruling on Order to Show Cause - R. 137; Minutes 
of Review Hearing - R. 162. (Addenda A and B). The defendant also challenges the 
district court's original jurisdiction for the first time of appeal. The exception of plain 
error is basis for this challenge. The felony charges originally filed were commenced by 
information on January 2, 2002. R. 4. The plain language of the information 
demonstrates that the charge was filed more than 4 years after the alleged offense was 
said to occur, "on or about May, 1997." Id. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1) (a) (Supp. 
2003) limits prosecutions for felonies excepted otherwise to four years stating "a felony 
or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed." Id. 
This Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3 (1953, as amended) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1 (b) (1953, as amended), and 
Utah R. App. P. 14. The defendant timely filed two notices of appeal; her notice of 
appeal was filed on February 7, 2006 and amended on April 6, 2006 following the entry 
of the court's final order revoking and reinstating her probation. The order was entered 
on March 27, 2006. R. 162. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the district court violated Section 77-18-1 when to 
extended probation relying solely on prior sentencing judge's in-court stated 
recommendation and intent that restitution be paid "within one year."? 
Preservation of Issue: The Sentence Judgment and Commitment of 
September 30, 2002, entered into the record on October 3, 2002 was not violated. R. 43. 
(Addendum D).1 The issue was addressed by Defendant at her hearings of: 
June 6, 2005 (T. 10) (seeking release from probation); 
July 5, 2005 (T. 15, 17) (asking the court to terminate probation as requested by 
AP&P); 
August 9, 2005 (T. 24, 26) (State conceding documents did not coincide with 
Court's intentions), (T. 25-26) (State moves to dismiss or strike the order to show cause 
because State lacked confidence to prove that Defendant violated her probation); (T. 28) 
(State concedes that Plea Agreement only required payment of $50,000 restitution, 
balance to convert to civil judgment); (T. 32) (order states restitution to be paid at a rate 
determined by AP&P); (T. 34) (Defendant faithfully paid her restitution as agreed); (T. 
36) (because of States's dismissal of order to show cause, requested that matter be reset 
1
 The original September 30,2002 sentence at R. 43 should not be confused with the 
false September 30, 2002 entry at R.123. 
2 
later for a review hearing); 
September 13, 2005 (T. 39) (State concedes that AP&P did not follow the Court's 
in-court stated intentions to have restitution paid within one year);2 
September 20, 2005 (T. 44, 48) (Defendant and State concur that prior OSC had 
been dismissed by State); (T. 46, 47, 49) (no violation of probation, therefore OSC was 
reset for Review only and Court denies ordering AP&P to file amended affidavit for 
OSC); (T. 50, 53) (State and Court agree to proceed on violation of probation upon tape 
of hearing, and court takes judicial notice - see footnote 1, supra.); (T. 56) (Defendant 
moves for extension of probation to prepare for evidentiary hearing of alleged probation 
violation); 
November 22, 2005 (T. 59) (evidentiary hearing before different judge); (T. 67-
69) (probation officer states the terms he followed stating only "$300,000 with interest" 
"at a rate determined by AP&P) and that he arranged payments of $500 a month); (T. 73) 
(Defendant "[paid] $500 per month consistently"); (T. 74) (probation officer testified 
erroneously that payment of $300,000 was to be paid in full by end of 36 months);3 
2
 The written order failed to state while on probation the restitution was to be paid 
within one year. That portion of the sentence was suspended along with the suspension of 
her prison incarceration. R. 43. 
3
 This testimony is contrary to the statements contained in AP&P's report requesting 
early termination of probation. R. 64-65; cf. R. 82-83 (AP&P's second progress/violation 
report filed alleging a violation contrary to previous request for early termination - this was 
ordered by the judge based upon his September 30, 2002 intentions. 
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Standard of Review: The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed 
de novo for correctness. State v. Gallic 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). When reviewing 
legal conclusions for correctness, the Courts grants "no deference to the district [court's] 
legal determinations." Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998). 
The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial 
court. Therefore, in order to succeed in this claim, defendant must show that the evidence 
of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so 
deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation. State 
v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). 
2. Issue: Whether the district court violated Gambill's rights to due process 
allowing a criminal matter to proceed when it was clear that the felony statute of 
limitations period in 76-1-302 had run? 
Preservation of Issue: Plain Error exception to issue raised first time on 
appeal. In the district court's record, the criminal information states the date of offense 
was "on or about May, 1997" and the date the information was filed was "January 2, 
2002." R. 1. The conviction of defendant, an Arizona citizen of Unregistered Securities 
Agent, a third decree felony and of Sale of Unregistered Security, a third degree felony 
was clear error, R. 38, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 ((1953, as amended). 
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Standard of Review: Because the issue is being raised for the first time 
on appeal, the Court must review the issue under a plain error standard. See State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To establish plain error, a defendant 
must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. See State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 
1993). In this case, Defendant raises the issue of statute of limitations. The 
determination of which limitations period applies to a third degree felony is a statutory 
interpretation, and a court's interpretation of a statute is a legal conclusion. State v. 
McGee, 31 P. 3d 531 (Utah 2001); State v. Burns. 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000); see also Quick 
Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C.. 12 P.3d 577 (Utah 2000). Furthermore, whether the 
statute of limitations has run is a legal conclusion. See Estes v. Tibbs. 979 P.2d 823 
(Utah 1999) ("The trial court's application of a statute of limitations presents a question 
of law [that] we review for correctness." (citing Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 
1998))). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES.* 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (Supp. 2003) Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (Supp. 2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2003) 
(* See these provisions in Addendum C). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This matter is the appeal of the district courts determination of a violation of 
Defendant's terms of probation. R. 41, 43, 166. After finding a perceived violation of 
probation for underpaying her restitution, the district court revoked and reinstated the 
defendant Jackie Gambill's probation for another 36 months. R. 137. This determination 
is illogical because Gambill's restitution payments were agreed to by AP&P as instructed 
in the Court's October 3, 2002 sentence judgment and commitment. R. 41, 43, 64, 145-
46, 152; T. 73.4 Originally, this proceeding commenced at the request of AP&P seeking 
Gambill's early termination from probation in April 2005. R. 64, 153. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
At issue of the court was whether the Defendant failed to pay her ordered 
restitution of $300,000 within the terms required. The issue was at the hearing on 
September 30, 2002 when the Defendant was sentenced, the in-court stated sentence was 
that Defendant was prison and restitution to be paid within one year. The court then 
stayed the commitment and ordered probation of 36 months. Judge Dawson restated that 
4
 At the evidentiary hearing in November 2005, the State's three exhibits are R. 145-
147, consisting of the Amended Affidavit for Order to Show Cause, AP&P's payment 
instructions, and Gambill's 11/20/2002 Probation Agreement. Defendant's three Exhibits 
are R. 147-157, consisting of the probation officer's affidavit, the 4/25/2005 progress report 
(R. 64), and another progress report recommending early termination. 
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the $300,000 restitution was to be paid as AP&P determined, and added he intended it to 
be paid within one year. In the entitle record, that is the only time Defendant was placed 
on notice her restitution would need to be paid within one year. 
Every entry of the record thereafter fails to address a time limit for Defendant to 
pay her restitution. Actually, the court's written, Sentence, Judgment and Commitment 
concerning the September 30, 2002 sentence is silent as to a time limit. That written 
sentence simply reads "to be paid at a rate determined by AP&P." The record shows that 
the State, AP&P, and Defendant all understood no limitation existed. At no time had 
anyone sought to correct the judgment either. Instead, on April, the State, through AP&P 
filed a progress report requesting the early termination of the Defendant's probation. 
Agent Haurand wrote, "Adult Probation and Parole recommends termination of formal 
supervised probation and requests remaining restitution be converted to civil judgment, 
or, that the subject remain on probation to the court and payment be made through the 
court." 
Relying on the request, Judge Dawson sent a review hearing on June 6, 2005. At 
that time, the court suggested that matter be converted to a civil judgment and the 
restitution thereafter to left to the victims to collect. T. 10. After addressing the matter 
further and then with a sidebar, the court decided he would review the sentencing tape 
and rescheduled the matter for a following hearing. T. 13-14. The matter was 
rescheduled for July 5, 2005. T. 14. 
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At the hearing held on July 5, 2005, T. 15, 17, Gambill asked the court to terminate 
probation as requested by AP&P. T. 15. The judge resisted AP&P^s request for early 
termination of probation arguing that he "ordered her to pay restitution of $300,000 to [] 
Edison Harris . . . $300,000 and I ordered that it be done in one year." T. 16. He 
clarified, "My problem is, I perceive she's in violation of the terms of probation. Do you 
see what I'm saying? T. 17. This perception was based upon his intentions that it be paid 
within one year. T. 18. Having predisposed the idea of a violation, the judge then 
directed AP&P to file an amended affidavit.5 T. 19. 
Following this conversation, the matter reconvened on August 9, 2005. At that 
time, the State conceded with Gambill that the documents pertaining to Mrs. Gambill did 
not coincide with Court's intentions stated in the court's tape of the September 30, 2002 
sentencing hearing where the court uttered his intentions. T. 24, 26 (T. 8). Because of 
the deficiency, the State moved to dismiss or strike the order to show cause because the 
State admittedly lacked confidence whether it could prove the defendant violated her 
probation. T. 25-26. The State conceded that the parties' plea agreement only required 
the payment of $50,000 restitution during probation and that the balance would convert to 
a civil judgment. T. 28. The prosecutor, Michael Direda admitted that defendant was 
5
 That amended affidavit is in the Record. R. 84, filed on July 20, 2005. However, 
a later amended affidavit was filed on September 20,2005. R. 119. That affidavit was later 
appears in the record, R. 147, submitted by Defendant at the November 22,2005 evidentiary 
hearing, marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1. 
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ordered restitution to be paid at a rate determined by AP&P. T. 32. The defendant 
argued that Mrs. Gambill faithfully paid her restitution as agreed between her and AP&P. 
T. 34. Direda also claimed that because of the State's dismissal of order to show cause, 
requested that matter be reset later for a review hearing alone. R. 113; T. 36. 
During the September 13, 2005 review hearing, the State conceded that AP&P did 
not follow the Court's intentions to have restitution paid within one year. T. 39.6 
Because of that discrepancy, the State confessed that in their office, the staff disputed as 
to "whether or not it can be extended without a violation being found but in the 
alternative . . . it is a violation because it was ordered by the Court that the $300,000 be 
paid within one year. . . ." T. 40. The judge offered to adjourn while the court and parties 
listened to the sentencing hearing tape. T. 40-41. Agreeing, the court went off the 
record, and in chambers watched the sentencing. T. 41. Afterwards, defendant asked to 
reschedule for the following week. T. 41-42. It was granted. 
During the September 20, 2005 hearing, just ten days before probation would 
expire, the defendant and State concurred that the prior OSC had been dismissed by the 
State, by Michael Direda. T. 44, 48. In that hearing, defendant urged the court to 
understand that no violation of probation resulted because she complied with the payment 
6
 The written order failed to state while on probation the restitution was to be paid 
within one year. That portion of the sentence was suspended along with the suspension of 
her prison incarceration. R. 43. 
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terms set by AP&P.7 T. 46, 47, 49. However, the court claimed to perceive otherwise, 
therefore he requested the OSC be reset for Review only. T. 46, 47, 49. During that 
hearing, the Court denied ordering AP&P to file an amended affidavit for OSC. Id. The 
State and the court agreed to proceed on violation of probation relying solely on the tape 
of the September 30, 2002 hearing, and the court took judicial notice - see footnote 1, 
supra. T. 50, 53. Defendant moved for an extension of her probation to prepare for 
evidentiary hearing of alleged probation violation. T. 56. 
During the November 22, 2005 evidentiary hearing, the matter was held before a 
different judge, Rodney S. Page, after a different Sentence, Judgment and Commitment 
was placed in the record apparently for him to follow. T. 59; R. 123.8 Agent Haradfadf, 
for AP&P, testified. He attested as to the terms he understood stating only "$300,000 
with interest" "at a rate determined by AP&P" and that he arranged payments of $500 a 
month. T. 67-69. No mention was made about the court's one year intention. He 
admitted Defendant "[paid] $500 per month consistently." T. 73. Her AP&P agent 
testified erroneously that payment of $300,000 was to be paid in full by end of 36 
7
 Note: Her actions were compliance with the original September 30,2002 sentence, 
judgment and commitment entered on October 3, 2002. R. 43. The Appellant urges this 
court to resist the false September 30, 2002 sentence, judgment and commitment in the 
record filed on or about 10/21/2005 (the day of Judge Dawson's recusal). R. 127, 123. 
8
 Note: The sentence, judgment and commitment filed here precedes Judge Dawson's 
voluntary recusal. The entry appear suspicious because the original sentence, judgment and 
committed by Judge Dawson signed on October 3,2002 is entirely different. See. R. 43. R. 
123 is a false entry. 
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months.9 T. 74. The written order, which must be followed, proscribes "Restitution is to 
be paid at a rate AP&P determines." R. 43. The probation agreement states, "12. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: . . . 5. Pay restitution in the amount of $300,000.00 plus 
interest to Edison Harris through AP&P at a rate determined by AP&P." R. 146. When 
AP&P requested termination of probation, her AP&P Agent reported: 
Ms. Gambill has paid $500 per month restitution since being placed on probation . 
. . . The subject states she is paying $100.00 per month supervision fee to the State 
of Arizona, which could also be added to the restitution payment if formal 
supervision were terminated. Her Arizona probation officer states she is compliant 
in all respects of supervision. 
Maximum benefit of being on formal probation has been achieved. Adult 
Probation and Parole recommends termination of formal supervised probation and 
requests remaining restitution be converted to civil judgment, or, that the subject 
remain on probation to the court and payment be made through the court. 
A civil judgment notice has been attached to this report. 
R. 65. This recommendation was consistent with the parties original agreement. R. 34. 
The parties' State of Defendant read, in pertinent part, Restitution/Fine related to terms of 
probation = $50,000 [double underlined] - balance to become civil matter via restitution 
order." R. 34. (emphasis added). 
9
 This testimony is contrary to the statements contained in AP&P's report requesting 
early termination of probation. R. 64-65; cf. R. 82-83 (AP&P's second progress/violation 
report filed alleging a violation contrary to previous request for early termination - this was 
ordered by the judge based upon his September 30, 2002 intentions. 
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C- DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
After a series of hearings, mostly probation reviews, and after one change of judge, 
the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on November 22, 2005, nearly two months 
after the defendant's original date her probation was to expire - September 30, 2005. At 
that hearing, the court considered the evidence before it and based on the court's stated 
intentions during the sentencing hearing "Restitution is to be paid to Adult Probation and 
Parole — and I placed here — a rate determined by Adult Probation and Parole with the 
Court's intent that it be paid as recommended by Adult Probation within one year," T. 8, 
extended Gambill's probation another 36 months. In the Court's PSI, the prosecutor at 
the time of sentencing, William McGuire, stated that the Restitution in this case is 
$300,000. He admitted to the PSI investigator that the event had taken place "5 years ago 
and an order of restitution needs to be entered." R. 175.10 (sealed documents) 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In this matter, the Defendant received $300,000 from Edison Harris. R. 33. The 
defendant Mrs. Gambill was not a licensed financial broker. R. 33. The money she 
retrieved was for investment purposes. Mr. Harris, who provided Ms. Gambill $300,000 
reported: 
10
 It needs to be noted that the court seal was already broken before defense counsel's 
retrieval of the record for purposes of briefing. 
12 
Mrs. Gambill took our money with the promise of paying us back a substantial 
increase, and return of out money ($300,000) a return of a ($90,000) profit, within 
ten days. 
When this didn't materialize, we contacted her, many many (sic) times. She 
promised to wire our money, and also interest on our money, (sic) She has never 
lined up to her commitment, or promise. 
Because of the actions of Jackie Gambill, most of our Retirement is gone . . . . 
R. 175 (Victim Impact Statement - sealed document). 
In particularly, Mr. Harris issued Mrs. Gambill a check on May 27, 1997. R. 175 
(sealed attachment to impact statement). This being the situation, in that Mrs. Gambill 
resided in Arizona and Mr. Harris being a Utah resident, and having only receiving a 
check for $28,000 in 1999,11 Mr. Harris sought criminal charges because she was not 
living up to her promises. See Impact Statement. (Broken promises are not crimes). On 
January 2, 2002, the Davis County Attorney's Office filed charges against Mrs. Gambill. 
R. 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
First, in this matter, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, 
the evidence is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking 
defendant's probation. State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). Clearly, 
according to the court's intentions stated in the September 30, 2002 hearing, T. 8, Mrs. 
Gambill did not pay her restitution as desired. However, both of the parties, the State's 
11
 According to the PSI report. R. 175 (sealed document, page 2). 
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prosecutors and AP&P staff all agreed that Mrs. Gambill was not and did not violate the 
Court's written order. As a matter of fact, the Court's own written Sentence, Judgment 
and Commitment can be said to violate that Court's stated intentions. The record reflects 
that on October 3, 2002, Judge Dawson who uttered his intentions two days earlier, 
signed and entered a written order, which failed to mention the court's intention too. R. 
43. The written order is absolutely silent as to "payment within one year." 
However, it is to be said, subject to the Defendant's accompanying motion to 
correct record, that there appears to be a nefarious entry. On or about October 21, 2005, a 
false, unsigned Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was placed into the record. R. 123. 
This false record precedes Judge Dawson's recusal. But in the light most favorable to 
Judge Dawson, the reflection of the "September 30, 2002 date" is a clerical error, not 
intending to deceive Judge Page but was intending to reflect his review of the Sentencing 
Hearing tape. 
Secondly, it would appear that the district court never should have accepted 
jurisdiction on this matter because it was want of jurisdiction but for the running of the 
statute of limitations for felony offenses. According to Utah law, the plain language of 
the information demonstrates that the charge was filed more than 4 years after the alleged 
offense was said to occur, "on or about May, 1997." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1) (a) 
(Supp. 2003) limits prosecutions for felonies excepted otherwise to four years stating "a 
felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed." 
14 
Id. Mr. Harris' own words indicate that he expected a $90,000 profit to begin within ten 
days of providing Mrs. Gambill his check for $300,000. R. 175 (victim impact statement 
and copy of check). A judge has a duty to be vigilant concerning the exercise of 
jurisdiction and on its own may challenge jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENTS. 
POINT ONE. THE DETERMINATION OF CONTEMPT FOR AN ALLEGED 
PROBATION VIOLATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE - THE 
COURT'S WRITTEN ORDER OF OCTOBER 3, 2002 DID NOT REQUIRE 
PAYMENT OF RESTITUTION "WITHIN ONE YEAR." 
In this matter, the defendant Jackie Sue Gambill challenges the district court's 
ruling, R. 137, and Judge Rodney S. Page's final order revoking and reinstating her 
probation entered March 27, 2006. R. 162. Those decisions resulted from an evidentiary 
hearing held on November 22, 2005, T. 59, and the court's subsequent hearing of 
February 21, 2006. T. 119. These decisions viewed in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings, the evidence is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in 
revoking defendant's probation. See State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). 
According to Jameson, the challenge by Defendant can only be successful when 
I 
she argues the evidence in the light most favorable to Judge Page showing the court 
abused it's discretion. Id. In this matter, Jackie cannot dispute that she followed the 
Judge's recommendation that restitution be paid "within one year." Also, she cannot 
argue that she met the court's expections, because he "intended" the restitution be paid 
15 
"within one year." The record is clear from the review of the tape and from a reading of 
the transcript made from the taped proceeding. T. 6-8. When former judge, Judge 
Dawson imposed his sentence and stayed prison in order to place Defendant on probation 
and pay restitution instead, the Court made it clear he intended Mrs. Gambill to repay Mr. 
Harris his $300,000 within one year. T. 8. In the hearing, Judge Dawson stated, inter 
alia: 
Restitution is to be paid to Adult Probation and Parole — and I placed here — a 
rate determined by Adult Probation and Parole with the Court's intent that it be 
paid as recommended by Adult Probation within one year." T. 8. 
T. 8. There is very little room to wiggle concerning this fact in light of Jameson. 
However, when viewed in light of other case law and the clear weight of the other 
evidence before the court including the admissions of all those involved, including 
prosecutors and AP&P agents and record, the district court did abuse its discretion. The 
decision to violate Mrs. Gambill and revoke and reinstate her probation was upon the 
single piece of evidence, that being the district court's intentions stated in court before 
publishing his written order on October 3, 2002. Even though all of the parties otherwise 
have agreed with Mrs. Gambill that she was "compliant" with the terms of her sentence, 
the departure started with the district court's own written order he entered less than three 
days following. On October 3, 2002, the Sentence, Judgment and Commitment is 
absolutely silent as to a time limitation for repaying monies to Mr. Harris. R. 43. The 
order for payment of restitution merely states, "Restitution is to be paid at a rate AP&P 
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determines." R. 45. (Addendum D). The parties' Plea Agreement intended Mrs. 
Gambill to only pay $50,000 before the remainder would convert to a civil judgment. R. 
34. (Addendum E). Adult Probation and Parole, on April 25, 2005, filed a progress 
report with the court seeking Mrs. Gambill's early termination. R. 64, 152; T. 73. The 
report was praising Mrs. Gambill. Even after the Court reviewed the situation and 
requested AP&P to file an Order to Show Cause on July 5, 2005, T. 19, the State, through 
the prosecutor Michael Direda, on August 9, 2005, T. 25, moved to dismiss the OSC 
because he felt the State "lacked the confidence" to prevail, T. 24-25, because the 
documents failed to coincide with the court's intentions. T. 24. Apparently, the State 
knew the written order of the court failed to impose a time limitation. Id. 
Despite the court's findings, the district court's determination failed to follow 
Court of Appeals guidance. In Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 
1996) this Court addressed circumstances similar dealing with recommendations of the 
commissioner, who addressed the defendant at the time the matter was to be rescheduled. 
In the subsequent hearing, the defendant did not appear even though requested by the 
Commissioner to be present. The commissioner wanted to hold that defendant in 
contempt. 
This Court held, "For the court to hold one in contempt of an order, that order must 
be clearly understood to be an order. To be enforced, an order must be sufficiently 
specific and definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning." Id, 
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at 455. (Citing International Longshoremen's Ass'n. Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine 
Trade Ass'n. 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S. Ct. 201, 208, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1967)). Then this 
Court clarified, "Moreover, the order need not be in writing, but it must be objectively 
understandable as an order from which sanctions may accrue for disobedience." Id. This 
Court stated that "Such was not the case here. Therefore, the State could not be 
sanctioned for disobeying the Commissioner's request." 
Here, Mrs. Gambill is similarly situated. Make no mistake, a finding of a violation 
of probation or failure to pay restitution is contempt. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (b) 
(1953, as amended) proscribes, inter alia: 
Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to 
pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (iii) (Supp. 2005). 
The "within one year" language made in the September 30, 2002 hearing, T. 8., as 
used by Judge Dawson included such words as "intent" and "recommend." The 
subsequent written order following, a mere three days later, on October 3, 2003, R. 43, 
ordered only "Restitution is to be paid at a rate AP&P determines." R. 45. Mrs. Gambill 
cannot be said to have understood differently than what was ordered. Judge Dawson's 
earlier statements of intentions or recommendations were not binding at the time when 
Mrs. Gambill and AP&P set their payment arrangements. (Addenda F & G). Here, 
AP&P set up $500 a month payments and Mrs. Gambill faithfully and consistently paid 
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that sum. T. 73. Her full compliance prompted the April 25, 2005 request by AP&P for 
early termination. R. 64-65, 152-53. (Addendum H). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1953, as amended) sets forth the only circumstance 
where probation may be extended. It reads, in pertinent part: 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding 
that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to 
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that 
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12) (a) & (b) (Supp. 2005). 
In summation, even though the district court's Judge Dawson made his intentions 
clear to Mrs. Gambill during the September 30, 2002 hearing, his actual order on October 
3, 2002 was less oppressive. It's only that order coupled with everyone's understanding, 
not just Mrs. Gambill's understanding alone, which should lead to this Court's 
conclusion that Judge Page did abuse his discretion when he considered the issue of 
whether Mrs. Gambill violated her probation because the clear weight of the court's order 
and the input of all those she was required to listen to which caused her to believe she 
was complying with the district court's order. Therefore, no violation of the terms or her 
probation pursuant Section 77-18-1 is possible and no contempt was ever apparent. The 
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judgment of the district court should be set aside. 
POINT TWO. 
THE STATE OF UTAH LACKED ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. NO 
COMMENCEMENT OF A CRIMINAL ACTION EVER SHOULD HAVE 
COMMENCED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. THE COURT, PLAINLY, 
FAILED ITS DUTY TO REALIZE IT LACKED SUBJECT-MATTER 
JURISDICTION. 
In this matter, Mrs. Gambill also raises the issue of jurisdiction first time on 
appeal. She challenges the trial court's original jurisdiction because of the running of the 
felony statute of limitations. The determination of which limitations period applies to a 
third degree felony is a statutory interpretation, and a court's interpretation of a statute is 
a legal conclusion. State v. McGee. 31 P. 3d 531 (Utah 2001); State v. Burns. 4 P.3d 795 
(Utah 2000); see also Quick Safe-T Hitch. Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C.. 12 P.3d 577 (Utah 
2000). Furthermore, whether the statute of limitations has run is a legal conclusion. See 
Estes v. Tibbs. 979 P.2d 823 (Utah 1999) ("The trial court's application of a statute of 
limitations presents a question of law [that] we review for correctness." {citing Julian v. 
State. 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998))). For legal conclusions no deference would be 
given to the trial court any how. 
Nevertheless, the issue is properly raised here because Mrs. Gambill invokes the 
plain error exception. Because the issue is being raised for the first time, while on appeal, 
this Court must review the issue under a plain error standard. See State v. Ellifritz. 835 
P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) 
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an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) 
the error is harmful. See State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). In this matter, 
all three elements exist. 
A, Error Indeed Occurred. 
In this matter, an error did in fact occur. The State's criminal information and Mr. 
Harris, the alleged victim, both admit that the alleged offense occurred in May, 1997. 
Specifically, Mr. Hariris' check was tendered to Mrs. Gambill on May 27, 1997. R. 175 
(sealed documents, see victim impact statement and copy of check). Even the prosecutor, 
William McGuire, admitted to the PSI investigator, that the alleged offense had occurred 
more than five years earlier. R. 175. The charges of Sale of Unlicensed Security (61-1-
7), a third degree felony, and Sale of Security by Unlicensed Broker-Dealer (61-1-3), a 
third degree felony, R. 4-5, were undisputedly filed on January 2, 2002. R. 1. The time 
span between May 27, 1997 to January 2, 2002 is a total of four years and six months and 
seven days. The statute of limitations had ran six months and seven days before criminal 
proceedings even commenced. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1) (a) (Supp. 2003) limits 
prosecutions for felonies excepted otherwise to four years stating "a felony or negligent 
homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed." Id. In this matter, 
the offense was allegedly committed on May 27, 1997 and when $90,000 profits were not 
received within 10 days, a reasonable person was placed on notice on or about June 6, 
21 
1997 that an offense may have been committed. There is no justification for an alleged 
delay of this kind. 
B. The Error was Obvious to the Court. 
The running of the statute of limitations is obvious, and should have been obvious 
to the district court. The information itself contained all the necessary ingredients to 
make that determination of an actual error. It has historically been the duty of the court to 
watch for violations of the statute of limitations, in that they are due process violations. 
See Department of Social Srvs. v. Viiil 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
The judge has a duty to continually inspect the record of the case, and if subject-matter 
jurisdiction does not appear at any time from the record of the case, then he has the duty 
to dismiss the case as lacking subject-matter jurisdiction. Should a judge act in any case 
in which he does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, he is acting unlawfully, U.S. v. 
Will 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821), and without any judicial 
authority. 
C. The Error Was Harmful. 
In this matter, the final element Mrs. Gambill must demonstrate is that she was 
harmed. The Defendant claims she was harms constitutionally in that he due process was 
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violated. Department of Social Srvs. v. Viiil 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) offers 
guidance here. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Vijil held that when a motion to vacate a judgment is 
based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction 
is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against 
whom it runs. Id, (citing In re Marriage of Stroud. 631 P.2d 168, 170 n.5 (Colo. 1981); 
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Given the duty 
of the court and in light of the Defendant's constitutional injury, the district court never 
should have allowed the proceeding to maintain. The matter should have been dismissed. 
CONCLUSION. 
Based upon constitutional violations of due process for the running of the statute 
of limitation period for felonies proscribed by Section 76-1-302, the State's prosecution 
of Mrs. Gambill, an Arizona resident, never should have commenced - it was nearly five 
years old at the time of it's filing by the Davis County Attorney. 
Based upon the district court violation of Section 77-18-1, this Court should vacate 
the defendant Jackie Sue Gambill's continued probation. The district court abused its 
discretion to find that Gambill violated the terms of her probation when she complied 
with the written order of October 3, 2002 and the instructions of those supervising her 
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probation. The clear evidence before the court was that she did not violate the terms of 
her probation only that everyone, including the judge when he wrote the October 3, 2002 
written order is that no one followed the court's in-court requests. It cannot be disputed 
that he made his intentions known and that he did state his recommendation to have Mrs. 
Gambill repay Mr. Harris "within one year." T. 8. Under the circumstances, in light of 
Dorman-Ligh. those comments from the judge can only be viewed as a request and not as 
a binding order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of 
January, 2007. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Appellant - Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 15th day of January, 2007,1 served 
a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the Appellee in 
this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid to the following address: J. Frederic Voros, Jr. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0854. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
JAN 0 9 2006 
SECOND COUNTY OF DAVIS, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT DISTRTCT HOIIRT 
State of Utah 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Jackie Sue Gambill 
Defendant 
RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND AFFIDAVIT IN VIOLATION 
Case No. 021700002 
Judge: Rodney S. Page 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above entitled Court on 
November 22, 2005. The State was present represented by Mr. Brandon Poll. The 
defendant was present and represented by Mr. D. Bruce Oliver. The Court having 
reviewed the arguments of counsel, the evidence that was presented at that time, and 
the video taped hearing of the sentencing which occurred on September 30, 2002, and 
the subsequent hearing on the Order to Show Cause which was heard on August 9, 
2005, and having reviewed the file in this matter, and being fully advised in the 
premises, rules as follows: 
The defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Glen R. Dawson on September 
30, 2002 to zero-to-five years in the State Prison, and a fine of $5,000 plus surcharge 
on each of the two counts. The Court then suspended the prison sentence and placed 
the defendant on probation to Adult Probation and Parole for 36 months. Among other 
things, her probation was conditioned upon her serving 60 days in jail and paying 
$300,000 restitution to the victims. 
The Court pronounced the sentence in open court. Defendant was present with 
her attorney and the Court specifically provided that restitution was to be paid within 
one year. The Court stated that the payment was to be set by Adult Probation and 
Parole so that in fact, it could be paid within one year. 
i Violal 
CD18810484 
, ^> <*? 
The Court asked defendant and counsel if they had any questions. Counsel for 
» the defendant questioned only the jail sentence and made a request for home 
w 
* confinement, which was denied by the Court. 
to i 
w Later on October 10, 2002, the offender signed an Offender Instruction Form 
$ 
^ which provided for restitution in the amount of $301,104 payable at the rate of $8,364 
per month (which would result in the complete payment over the 36 month term of 
probation). On that same date, she also signed a Probation Agreement which, among 
other things, provided for payment of restitution in the amount of $300,000 at the rate to 
be determined by Adult Probation and Parole. 
The defendant was never able to make the $8,300 payment per month, neither 
has she paid the full amount of the restitution. 
She was subsequently compacted to Arizona and at some point probation in 
Arizona agreed that payment would be reduced to $500 per month. The defendant has 
made the $500 per month payments as agreed with probation and complied with other 
terms of probation; however, she still owes over $200,000 on restitution. 
An affidavit of violation was filed by Adult Probation and Parole on July 20, 2005 
alleging that defendant had violated her Probation agreement by having failed to pay 
the complete restitution. That affidavit was subsequently amended by an affidavit 
which was filed on August 2, 2005 alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with 
the terms of probation as ordered by the Judge in failing to pay the restitution as 
ordered. 
The matter came on for hearing on August 9, 2005. Adult Probation and Parole 
requested that probation be terminated and that restitution be converted to a civil 
2 
judgment for collection. The State opposed that recommendation and counsel agreed 
•* that the matter be continued to September 13, 2005 for further hearing before Judge 
0
 Dawson on the question of violation of probation and the issue of termination of 
5J probation. 
H Prior to the hearing on September 13th, Judge Dawson recused himself and the 
matter was reassigned to this Court for determination by order entered on November 2, 
2005. 
The matter came before the Court for hearing on November 9, 2005, as stated 
above. 
The Court finds that defendant was placed on probation by the Honorable Glen 
R. Dawson on September 30, 2002. As part of that sentence, defendant was ordered 
to pay restitution in the amount of $300,000. Neither the defendant nor her counsel 
objected to that condition of probation as ordered by the Court in open court on that 
date. Further the defendant acknowledged the $300,000 both in the Offender 
Instruction Form and the Probation Agreement that she signed on October 10, 2002. 
Although there has been some confusion as to the rate at which the restitution 
was to be paid, there has never been any confusion in the sentence imposed by the 
Court nor in the documents of Adult Probation and Parole, that the restitution amount 
was $300,000. 
The Court finds that defendant is bound by the order of the Court and her 
probation agreement to pay $300,000 in restitution. 
The Court would find that she has failed to pay the restitution as ordered by the 




would justify the Court in revoking her probation at this time. However, in light of the 
» extensive amount of restitution yet to be paid, the Court will extend the formal probation 
* of the defendant to Adult Probation and Parole for the purposes of collecting restitution, 
p That restitution is to be paid on such terms and conditions as shall be set by the Court 
at a subsequent hearing. Until that time, defendant is ordered to continue to maker her 
present payment to Adult Probation and Parole. 
The Court extends probation pursuant to its authority under Section 77-18-1 et. 
seq. and pursuant to case law as set forth in State of Utah vs. Noyes, 2000 UT App 
211; and State vs. Dickey, 841 P 2nd 1203 (1992). 
This Court further finds that the filing of the affidavits and orders to show cause 
by Adult Probation and Parole on July 20, 2005 and August 2, 2005, tolled the running 
of any probationary period. 
This decision does not consider nor rule on any claimed irregularities in 
defendant's plea of guilty. 
Counsel are directed to set the matter for further hearing on the question of 
payment at a time that is convenient for the Court and counsel. Counsel for the State is 
to take the lead in setting that hearing. 
Dated this 9 ^ day of January, AD 2006 
BY THE COURT: 
Rodney S J P a ^ o / S ^ ^ ^£ ' 
District Court Jjd^e O r \^\ 
\VnN~. **' ^* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ruling tor 
Brandon Poll 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and 
Adult Probation and Parole 
883 West Clark Lane 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
postage prepaid this *f-£- day of January, AD 2006. 
Alyson Brown 
Clerk of Court 
By__iL/2 
ffacy Barja^y 
4>€ eputy Ceiirt Clerk 
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Case No: 021700002 FS 
Judge: RODNEY S PAGE 
Date: February 21, 2 006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tacyb 
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 2, 1945 
Video 
Tape Number: 2/21/06 Tape Count: 3:59 
CHARGES 
2. UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/19/2002 Guilty 
3. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/19/2002 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 2/21/06 COUNT: 3:59 
This is the time set for review of probation and to set 
restitution payments. 
The Court previously ruled that it has jurisdiction in this matter 
and continued defendant's probation and terms, 
Mr. Oliver has 
The Court will 
probation. 
The Court recounts history of the case. It was Judge Dawson's 
that defendant pay the full amount of restitution, $300,000, within 
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filed an appeal to that ruling, as is his right 
proceed with this matter and set terms of 
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one year. Defendant was compacted to Arizona and has been making 
$500-per-month payments. 
Mr. Poll requests an increase in payments. 
Mr. Oliver states that all the payments defendant has made have 
not been credited toward the total restitution owed. She made 
payments of $28,000 and $42,000 prior to sentencing. 
He states that it was defendant's understanding that if she paid 
$5 0,00 0, the balance would be converted to a civil judgment. To 
that end, she made a payment of $25,0 00. 
In the meantime, she was incarcerated and could not pay the other 
$25,000. At that time her husband filed for divorce (which was 
later dismissed) and her business partner absconded with all the 
business funds. 
After defendant's release, she began paying $500 per month as 
agreed by her probation officer in Arizona. She was trying to pay 
the other $25,000, so that the balance can be converted to a civil 
judgment. Those payments total $18,000. 
The Court requests testimony from defendant regarding her assets 
and income. 
Defendant, Jackie Sue Gambill, is sworn and testifies. 
Defendant corrects Mr. Oliver's representation that the monthly 
payments she made in Arizona totaled $18,000, stating that 
additional payments were made bringing the amount to $25,000. 
Defendant has a Honda purchased for her by her son, as well as a 
Jeep purchased for her by her husband. Her husband drives a Honda. 
The Court questions defendant regarding the income and assets of 
her husband. 
Defendant states that she has been married for fourteen years. 
The marital home is in a trust. Defendant states she receives very 
little information regarding her husbands assets or income. 
Defendant's husband's income includes social security, military 
retirement (from which she will receive no survivor benefit) and 
$100,000 per year earnings from Honeywell. 
Defendant is informed that as of sentencing, the amount owed is a 
c ivi1 j udgment. 
Victim, Edison Harris, makes statements to the Court. 
Probation is revoked and restarted as of the date of the Court's 
ruling in the matter, January 9, 2006. 
The Court orders that Mr. Poll is to determine what has been paid 
and the remaining balance owing. If further hearing is needed to 
make a determination, the matter can be put back on the calendar. 
The Court orders that judgment enter with interest to accrue at 
the legal rate at the time of sentencing. 
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Mr. Harris is informed that he can collect on this judgment 
through a civil attorney in Arizona. 
The Court states that there is no provision to find that defendant 
violated probation, unless it is determined that she had resources 
to pay the restitution in full and did not. 
The Court will review this matter every six months. A review is 
set 8/22/06 at 3:30 p.m. Defendant need not be present unless so 
ordered, but counsel are to be here. 
Mr. Oliver,requests that defendant be taken off formal probation, 
so that the $100 supervisory fee she is paying to the State of 
Arizona can be applied toward restitution. 
The Court may consider that in the future, but denies it at this 
time. 
Defendant is to go with Probation Officer Mr. Hamberlin to sign 
another probation application to Arizona. 
The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant's probation is reinstated. 
Previous terms and conditions of probation apply. 
Defendant is to pay restitution at $700 per month. 
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In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Ali Holmes at 
801-447-3818 at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
The general information phone number is 801-44 7-3800. 
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Addendum C 
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions 
§ 76-1-301 CRIMINAL CODE 
Library References 
Criminal Law ®=>147. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 11 Okl47. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids Wharton's Criminal Law § 92, Statute of 
2 Criminal Law Defenses § 202, Statute of Limitations. 
Limitations. 
§ 7 6 - 1 - 3 0 1 . 5 . Time limitations for prosecution of misusing public monies, 
falsification or alteration of government records, and bribery 
(1) A prosecution for misusing public monies, falsification or alteration of 
government records, or for a bribery offense shall be commenced within two 
years after facts constituting the offense have been reported to a prosecutor 
having responsibility and jurisdiction to prosecute the offense. 
(2) This section does not shorten the limitation of actions under Section 
76-1-302 or Subsection 76-1-303(3). 
Laws 1995, c. 232, § 2, eft May 1, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 155, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
2002, c. 208, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2002, c. 208, inserted in subsec. (2) 
"Section 76-1-302 or". 
Library References 
Criminal Law <s=>147. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 11 Okl 47. 
§ 76—1-302 . Time limitations for prosecution of offenses—Provisions if 
DNA evidence would identify the defendant—Commencement of prosecu-
tion 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years 
after it is committed; 
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be commenced 
within two years after it is committed; and 
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is commit-
ted. 
(2)(a) A prosecution for the offenses listed in Subsections 
76-3-203.5(l)(c)(i)(A) through (P) may be commenced at any time if the identity 
of the person who committed the crime is unknown but DNA evidence is 
collected that would identify the person at a later date. 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply if the statute of limitations on a crime 
has run as of May 5, 2003, and no charges have been filed. 
(3) If the statute of limitations would have run but for the provisions of 
Subsection (2) and identification of a perpetrator is made through DNA, a 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS § 76-1-302 
Note 3 
prosecution shall be commenced within one year of the discovery of the identity 
of the perpetrator. 
(4) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an indictment 
by a grand jury or upon the filing of a complaint or information. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-302; Laws 1985, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 2, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 5, 
§ 1; Laws 2003, c. 61, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2003, c. 61, inserted new subsecs. (2) 
and (3). 
Cross References 
Securities, limitation of prosecutions, see § 61-1-21.1. 
Library References 
Criminal Law <3=>147, 148.1, 154, 157. C J . S . Criminal Law §§ 199 to 202, 206. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110kl47; 
110kl48.1; 110kl54; 110kl57. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids Wharton's Criminal Law § 92, Statute of 
1 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition Limitations. 
§ 1.7(D), Ordinance Violations. 
Notes of Decisions 
Fraud 3 
Prearrest delay 4 
Retroactive application 1 
Tolling of limitations period 
Waiver by guilty plea 5 
1. Retroactive application 
1996 amendment to limitations statute, which 
added aggravated sexual abuse of a child to the 
list of crimes specifically covered by the four-
years-after-report statute of limitations, did not 
apply retroactively to allow the state to charge 
defendant with alleged sexual abuse that oc-
curred in 1983 and 1984, as the applicable four-
year catchall limitations statute expired before 
the amendment became effective. U.C.A. 1953, 
76-1^-303.5, 76-5-404.1(3); U.C.A. 1953, 
76-l-302(l)(a) (1978). State v. Lusk, 2001, 37 
P 3 d 1103, 436 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2001 UT 102. 
Criminal Law <®=> 146 
Legislature, in amending statute of limitations 
could have extended amended statute to crimes 
committed prior to the amendment, without 
running afoul of the ex post facto prohibition in 
the State and Federal Constitutions. U.C.A. 
!953, 68-3-3, 76-l-302(l)(a) , 76-1-303, 
76-U303(c), 76-l-307(c), 76-5-402.1, 
76-5^402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404.1. 
State v. Lavoto, 1989, 776 P.2d 912. Constitu-
tional Law <£=> 197; Criminal Law <$=> 146 
17 
2. Tolling of limitations period 
Aggravated robbery prosecution was not 
barred by four-year statute of limitations, al-
though robbery occurred in September 1976 
and defendant was not tried until June 1985, 
given statute providing that period of limitation 
does not run against defendant during time he 
is out of state following commission of offense. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-l~302(l)(a), 76-1-304. State v. 
Wright, 1987, 745 P.2d 447, denial of habeas 
corpus affirmed 986 F.2d 1432, certiorari de-
nied 114 S.Ct. 108, 510 U.S. 834, 126 L.Ed.2d 
74, dismissal of habeas corpus affirmed 886 
P.2d 58. Criminal Law ©=» 152 
Filing of an information commences action 
and thus tolls running oi applicable statute of 
limitations. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-302(2), 
77-35-5(a, b). State v. Strand, 1983, 674 P.2d 
109. Criminal Law <3=> 157 
August 1981 information charging defendant 
with making false material statements under 
oath, although later dismissed because it lacked 
signature of prosecuting attorney, served to toll 
statute of limitations, which did not resume 
running until February 24, 1982, the date infor-
mation was dismissed. U.C.A.1953, 
76-l-302(l)(a) , 76-8-502(1). State v. Strand, 
1983, 674 P.2d 109. Criminal Law <3=> 160 
3. Fraud 
Statute extending limitations period for prose-
cuting offenses involving fraud for one year 
PUNISHMENTS §76-3-201.1 
appeal did not preclude Supreme Court from choice of sentence as required by statute re-
requinng that defendant be lawfully sentenced, quired resentencing U C A 1953, 
where trial court had unquestionably erred by 76-3-20 l(6)(b), 76-5-301 1(4) State v Shick-
overlookmg minimum mandatory sentencing l e s , 1988, 760 P 2d 291 Sentencing And Pun-
provisions applicable to offenses of which de-
 l shment to 2251, Kidnapping <&» 41, Sentenc-
fendant had been convicted, and State could not
 And P l m i s h m e n t ^ 3 7 3 
properly have appealed the issue U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
76-3-201(5), 76-5-302, 76-5-405, 77-35-26(c) T n a l C O u r t h a s discretion m sentencing and 
State v Babbell, 1989, 770 P 2d 987 Criminal m a y o r d e r sentences to run consecutively, and 
Law <©=> 1136 Supreme Court will not disturb sentence unless 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion m lt exceeds that prescribed by law or unless trial 
sentencing defendant to presumptive ten-year c o u r t abused its discretion U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
term of middle seventy, rather than lower five- 76-3-201, 76-3-401 State v * Shelby, 1986, 
year term, for conviction of kidnapping of child, 728 P 2d 987 Criminal Law <§=» 1147, Sen-
but trial court's refusal to state reasons for its tencmg And Punishment <3=» 548 
§ 76 -3—201 .1 . Collection of criminal judgment accounts receivable 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Criminal judgment accounts receivable" means any amount due the 
state arising from a criminal judgment for which payment has not been 
received by the state agency that is servicing the debt. 
(b) "Accounts receivable" includes unpaid fees, overpayments, fines, forfei-
tures, surcharges, costs, interest, penalties, restitution to victims, third party 
claims, claims, reimbursement of a reward, and damages. 
(2)(a) A criminal judgment account receivable ordered by the court as a 
result of prosecution for a criminal offense may be collected by any means 
authorized by law for the collection of a civil judgment. 
(b)(i) The court may permit a defendant to pay a criminal judgment 
account receivable in installments. 
(ii) In the district court, if the criminal judgment account receivable is 
paid in installments, the total amount due shall include all fines, sur-
charges, postjudgment interest, and fees. 
(c) Upon default in the payment of a criminal judgment account receivable 
or upon default in the payment of any installment of that receivable, the 
criminal judgment account receivable may be collected as provided in this 
section or Subsection 77-18-1(9) or (10), and by any means authorized by 
law for the collection of a civil judgment. 
(3) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a criminal judgment 
account receivable or any installment of that receivable, the court, on motion of 
the prosecution, victim, or upon its own motion may: 
(a) order the defendant to appear and show cause why the default should 
not be treated as contempt of court; or 
(b) issue a warrant of arrest. 
(4)(a) Unless the defendant shows that the default was not attributable to an 
intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure to make a good 
feith effort to make the payment, the court may find that the default constitutes 
contempt. 
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(b) Upon a finding of contempt, the court may order the defendant com-
mitted until the criminal judgment account receivable, or a specified part of 
it, is paid. 
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default is not 
contempt, the court may enter an order for any of the following or any 
combination of the following: 
(a) require the defendant to pay the criminal judgment account receivable 
or a specified part of it by a date certain; 
(b) restructure the payment schedule; 
(c) restructure the installment amount; 
(d) except as provided in Section 77-18-8, execute the original sentence of 
imprisonment; 
(e) start the period of probation anew; 
(f) except as limited by Subsection (6), convert the criminal judgment 
account receivable or any part of it to community service; 
(g) except as limited by Subsection (6), reduce or revoke the unpaid 
amount of the criminal judgment account receivable; or 
(h) in the district court, record the unpaid balance of the criminal judg-
ment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility 
for collecting the judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(6) In issuing an order under this section, the court may not modify the 
amount of the judgment of complete restitution. 
(7) Whether or not a default constitutes contempt, the court may add to the 
amount owed the fees established under Subsection 63A-8-201(4)(g) and post-
judgment interest. 
(8)(a)(i) If a criminal judgment account receivable is past due in a case 
supervised by the Department of Corrections, the judge shall determine wheth-
er or not to record the unpaid balance of the account receivable as a civil 
judgment. 
(ii) If the judge records the unpaid balance of the account receivable as a 
civil judgment, the judge shall transfer the responsibility for collecting the 
judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(b) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by 
the Department of Corrections is past due, the district court may, without a 
motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the criminal judgment 
account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility for 
collecting the account receivable to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(c) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by 
the Department of Corrections is more than 90 days past due, the district 
court shall, without a motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the 
criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the 
responsibility for collecting the criminal judgment account receivable to the 
Office of State Debt Collection. 
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Repealed 
<{9)(a) When a fine, forfeiture, surcharge, cost permitted by statute, fee, or an 
)rder of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, 
he person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation 
)r association shall pay the obligation from those assets. 
(b) Failure to pay the obligation may be held to be contempt under 
Subsection (3). 
(10) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in behalf of a victim. 
_aws 1979, c 69, § 2, Laws 1983, c. 262, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 2, Laws 1999, c. 
>79, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 135, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002, Laws 2003, c. 278, 
? 1, eff May 5, 2003 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
t a w s 2002, c 135, modified a statute refer- Laws 2003, c 278, inserted m subsec (l)(b) 
'nee in subsec (7) "reimbursement of a reward" 
Cross References 
Contempt, see § 78-32-1 et seq 
3mce of state debt collection created, see § 63A-8-201 
Library References 
Contempt <3=25 C J S Contempt § 14 
Costs @=>320 C J S Criminal Law §§ 1771 to 1786 
Sentencing and Punishment <S»2213 to 2217 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 93k25, 
102k320, 350Hk2213to350Hk2217 
Notes of Dec i s ions 
tn general 1 Court had jurisdiction to recall defendant and 
hold him or her accountable for full payment of 
restitution or fines according to sentencing or-
L In general der to which defendant had previously agreed 
Under former statutes, trial court which had U C A 1953, 76-3-201 1(1), 77-18-1(13) State 
accepted recommendation by Department of v Dickey, 1992, 841 P 2d 1203, certiorari de-
*<iult Probation and Parole (AP&P) that it su- nied 853 P 2d 897 Sentencing And Pumsh-
-rvise balance of probationary term imposed ment <&=> 2213, Fines <&=> 2 
igainst defendant, who had fulfilled all condi- Trial court properly exercised jurisdiction to 
ions of probation except payment of restitution, enforce restitution order after period of defen-
*nd had declined to extend probationary period, dant's probation expired, where action was 
etained continuing jurisdiction to enforce resti- within eight years from entry of judgment or-
ution order after probationary period had ex- denng payment of restitution U C A 1953, 
Dlred u C A 1953, 76-3-201, U C A 1953, 76-3-201, 76-3-201 (3)(a), 76-3-201 1(5), 
7
^ 3 - 2 0 l 1 (1983) State v Nones, 2000, 11 77-18-1(13), 77-18-6, 78-22-1 State v Dick-
3d 709, 399 Utah Adv Rep 14, 2000 UT App ey, 1992, 841 P 2d 1203, certiorari denied 853 
ll l Sentencing And Punishment <3=> 1948 P 2d 897 Sentencing And Punishment <S=> 2215 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 . 2 . Repealed by Laws 2002, c. 35, § 15, eff. May 6, 2002 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
"
e
 repealed section related to civil actions by 
/ l ctims for damages 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 . 3 . Repealed by Laws 1996, c. 40, § 15, eff. April 29, 1996 
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(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's 
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certifi-
cate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance wiilff 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervise 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordar 
with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felonf 
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemi 
ors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period xi 
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the ac<| 
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jt 
tion of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation^ 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable,, 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall records 
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorde 
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the 4)| 
State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the deferi| 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as conte 
court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office* 
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advan§| 
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report *a| 
plete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confineine 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing| 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total P r°b3j| 
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke t h ^ J 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing.^ 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute ser 
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rard the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
glring. 
flhe running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
ttion report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
| of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
ie court. 
Z)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
iig by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
Utioner has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
landing that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
|(B)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts assert-
t^o constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
luthorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
ause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
fstified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
fearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
Rearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for 
him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecut-
ing attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of proba-
tion, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
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Addendum D 
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment 
2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACKIE SUE GAMBILL, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021700002 FS 
Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON 
Date: September 30, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lanas 
Prosecutor: MCCUIRE, WILLIAM K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, GEOFFREY 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 2, 1945 
Video 
Tape Number: 9-3 0-02 Tape Count: 3:05 
CHARGES 
2. UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/19/2002 Guilty 
3. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/19/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED 
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
Case No: 021700002 
Date: Sep 30, 2002 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 
60 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED 
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 60 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE 
No work release is granted. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 Fine: $9250.00 
Suspended: $9250.00 
Charge # 3 Fine: $9250.00 
Suspended: $9250.00 
Total Fine: $18500.00 
Total Suspended: $18500.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $300000.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: EDISON HARRIS 
Page 2 
Case No: 021700002 
Date: Sep 30, 2002 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
Restitution is to be paid at a rate AP&P determines. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 12 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law. 
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or 
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement. 
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee. 
No involvement in Security Sales. 
_ £ > 
Dated this 3> day of Oci^ , 20 Q Q . 
Page 3 (last) 
Addendum E 
Statement of Defendant 
- s & * 
4^ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
^ A c E i - e G i t w h l \ 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Dciciiuant. 
, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have 
been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crimes: 







/$/fltM $*?..* I f*)&*r) ^h li$s(rr?*^eh> o - SI i*$-
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to me, and 
I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: . 
iFf W ^ Ky7!~~ A / /S^^S^ T ' Y\fhQfi iA / Q/P/^-I 
AC' T~ ft-fr-jikrr-* Th, . L 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed above. I stipulate 
and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to 
which I am pleading guilty 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the constitutions 
of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an 
attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might later, if the judge determined that 
I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I also understand my 
rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is C^-fyf^f)^ (s/tfhZjK . My attorney and 
I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that 
I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, a) I would 
have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived 
my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to 
-2-
and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not 
afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I 
would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one could make me 
testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that 
they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am presumed 
innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I 
need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be 
unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting that I 
committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those 
costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and 
constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which I am 
pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting 
myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that 
I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on 
charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, the 
sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time (concurrently), I 
know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation 
or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, 
my guilty plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now 
pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, Iknow the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty plea(s) (is/are not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this 
statement, including those explained below: fe^.1 <>-& f fy t>T" ~ / ^ P AF ^^f) 
tt—fr-gjtm^—t~f PromptT{DI\) V $SOj 06q= h&irr^&e. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or 
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel 
or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to 
what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement have been 
made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its contents and 
adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. j *n J 
I am years of age. I have attended school through the / C^J ^grade. I can read and understand 
the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the 
influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding these 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would 
prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea(s), I must file a written motion to withdraw my 
plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to 




Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for ^\f)0Xi^ Cl^J^^oj0) / h t n e defendant above, and that I 
know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and 
believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To 
the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the 
factua) synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney \ / ) * / 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case a g a i n s t - Q ^ ^ ^ W ^ ^ I / , < , defendant. 
I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a 
plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement; 
Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court^There is reasonable i 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offe^se(s) for which 1 
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY 
Bar No. 7 / ^ 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and counsel, 
and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that the defendant's 
guilty plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea(s) to the crime(s) set forth in the Statement 
be accepted and entered. 
Dated this [ ^ day of i 4 — ^ , 20^Q_. 




STATE OF UTAH 








I, JACKIE SUE GAMBILL, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be accountable for my actions and conduct to 
the Department of Corrections and the Court. I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the court and set forth in this Agreement, consistent with 
the laws of the state of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or any conditions thereof, or any new conviction for a crime, may result in action by 


















SPECIAL7 / -> kJ\ 
CONDITIONSr-CZ2>! 
Permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by agents of Adult Probation and Parole for the purpose of 
ensuring compliance with the conditions of the probation agreement. 
Not abscond from probation supervision. A-Reporting: Report as directed by the Department of Corrections. B-Residence: Establish and 
reside at a residence of record and not change residence without first obtaining permission from the probation agent. C-Leaving the 
State: Not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other state to which I am released or transferred without prior written permission 
from the probation agent. Reporting Instructions: Report as directed by your agent. 
Obey all state, federal and municipal laws. If arrested, cited or questioned by a peace officer; notify the probation agent within 48 hours. 
Not possess, have under control, have in custody or on the premises where residing any explosives, firearms or dangerous weapons. 
(Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the supervising agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to 
individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and who have never been convicted of a felony. 
Abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled substances (58-37-2 
U.C.A.) and submit to tests of breath or body fluids to ensure compliance with the probation agreement. 
Permit agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search person, residence, vehicle or any other property under control without a warrant, at 
any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the conditions of the probation agreement. 
Not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in criminal activity or who has been convicted of a felony without approval 
from the probation ageflt. 
Unless otherwise authorized by the probation agent; seek, obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful, full-time employment (32 hours per 
week minimum) as approved by the probation agent. Notify probation agent of any change in my employment within 48 hours of the 
change. 
Be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all dealings with Adult Probation and Parole. 
Agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department of Corrections under the provisions of Utah 
Statute 64-13-21. 
Comply jwith Utah CodeAmL.SectionsJ3 A 0-403 -406 -by submitting an adequate DNA specimen, and, unless determination is made that 
theperif ndjability to pay, reimburse the responsible agency $75.00 for the cost of obtaining the specimen. 
Complete any other terms or conditions of probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement. 
'Commit no further violations and/or crimes. 
Complete DNA testing and pay the $75.00 fee. 
Serve 60 days in the Davis County Jail with no work release commencing forthwith. 
Pay restitution in the amount of $300,000.00 plus interest to Edison Harris through AP&P at a rate determined by AP&P. 
No involvement in security sales. 
I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate any of the conditions of this agreement, the Court may revoke my Probation or the 
Department of Corrections may take other appropriate action against me, and I hereby acknowledge of a copy of this agreement. 
Dated this c* U day of A\) CUn/ . 2 0 Q ^ -
Witness; .^Probationer:, 
•V y ^SdX 









OFFENDER INSTRUCTION FORM 
DISTRICT COURT 
Offender: (pAf* &lU , ^A^l^ Offender #: / X K ? ^ / / Court Case Number(s))d?/ 7£&Z><£l 
PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
1. As a condition of probation>'parole you are required to pay $ %. 3L**~/ per month 
beginning in W W 
(month/year) 
2. You will receive a monthly bill in the mail. It will tell you the total amount owed and the amount due for the month. 
3. The bill will include an envelope in which you are to mail your payment. Please include the return stub of the bill 
with your payment. 
4. DO NOT MAIL CASH!! Your payments should be made by personal check, money order or cashier's check made 
payable to the Department of Corrections. Always write your offender number on your payment. 
5. You will be informed if you are not allowed to pay by personal check. 
6. If your personal check is returned for insufficient funds, you will no longer be allowed to pay by personal check. 
7. A payment may be made without a bill by printing your name and offender number on a sheet of paper and attaching 
it to your check or money order. 




le State of Utah may seize income tax refunds to pay restitution/fines/fees. 
ui 3 erest may be added to unpaid restitution. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT NO. rQ 
CASE NO. 0J>nC?riX^^ 
DATEREC'D . , . 








SUPERVISION FEE APPEAL NOTIFICATION 
§ § you feel you cannot afford to pay the supervision fee, an appeal process is available. Contact your agent for 
g ° tructions. 
CM o o 
§ ave read (or had read to me) and understand the above information. 
ISJ-^r , 
/Offender's1 Signature / / ~^o-a Date Agent's Signature \ Date 
Addendum H 
Request for Termination 
STATE OF UTAH 




TO: 2ND DISTRICT -
Farmington, Davis County, Utah 
ATTN: Judge Glen R. Dawson 
FROM: Farmington A.P.& P. 
^ * 
REGARDING: GAMBILL, Jackie Sue x%> 
CASE NO.: 021700002 
OFFENSE: Sale Of Unregistered Security, Third 
Degree Felony 
Unregistered Securities Agent, Third Degree 
Felony 
DATE: 04/19/2005 
PROBATION DATE: 09/30/2002 
LEGISLATIVE DATE: 09/29/2005 
DEFENSE ATTY: Geoffrey L. Clark 
(Subject states she has 
retained Bruce Oliver) 
COMMENTS: 
OFFENDER*: 152411 
ADDRESS: 16150 E POWDER HORN, 
FOUNTAIN HILLS AZ 85268 
EMPLOYMENT: Owner, Covered Parking, 
17100 E. Shea BlvdSte 200, 
Fountain Hills AZ 85268 
DEFbNDANT'S EXHIBITl 




C L E R K " " " 
On 09/30/2002, Jackie Sue GAMBILL was placed on probation with the following conditions: 
1. Complete any other terms or conditions of probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation 
agreement. 
2. Commit no further violations and/or crimes. 
3. Complete DNA testing and pay the $75.00 fee. 
4. Serve 60 days in the Davis County Jail with no work release commencing forthwith. 
5. Pay restitution in the amount of $300,000.00 plus interest to Edison Harris through AP&P at a rate 
determined by AP&P. 
6. No involvement in security sales. 
The subject is residing in Arizona and supervised under Compact Agreement. No violations have been 
reported. 
/;:z. 
RE: GAMBILL, Jackie Sue - 2 -
or, 
?!: 
Ms. Gambill has paid $500 per month restitution since being placed on probation. Her three year 
termination date is September 28,2005. The restitution of $300,000.00 remains an issue as she still 
owes nearly $265,000.00. Rather than signing a waiver to appear, the subject requests a review hearing 
date before the court. 
It should be noted that the victim in this case, Edison Harris (telephone # 825-4443) has called AP&P 
recently, expressing interest in this case, as a large amount of restitution is still owed. 
The purpose of this report is to request a review hearing, allowing the subject ample time to travel from 
Arizona. 
The subject states she is paying $100.00 per month supervision fee to the State of Arizona, which could 
also be added to the restitution payment if formal supervision were terminated. Her Arizona probation 
officer states she is compliant in all aspects of supervision. 
Maximum benefit of being on formal probation has been achieved. Adult Probation and Parole 
recommends termination of formal supervised probation and requests remaining restitution be converted 
to civil judgment or, that the subject remain on probation to the court and payment be made through the 
court. — ~~ ~ " — 
A civil judgment notice has been attached to this report. 
ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT: NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND THE COURT. 
REeOMMENDATIONrlfts respectfully recommended the court schedule a probation review hearing in 
order to address restitution and formal supervised probation status. 
HANK HAURAND, PROBATION OFFICER 
APPROVED AND ORDERED 




RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED: 
